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A TALE OF TWO COPYRIGHTS: LITERARY
PROPERTY IN REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE
AND AMERICA
JANE

I.

C.

GINSBURG*

INTRODUCTION

The French and U.S. copyright systems are well known as
opposites. The product of the French Revolution, French copyright law is said to enshrine the author: exclusive rights flow
from one's (preferred) status as a creator.' For example, a lead* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1976, M.A. 1977,
University of Chicago; J.D. 1980, Harvard University. Research for this Article was
supported in part by the Columbia Law School Summer Research Grants program.
Thanks to my colleagues George Bermann, Richard Briffault, Henry P. Monaghan,
and Peter Strauss, and to Professor John Merryman, Stanford Law School, for valuable
comments on earlier drafts. Paola de Kock, Columbia Law School class of 1990, provided
helpful research assistance. Special thanks to Professor Carla Hesse, University of
California, Berkeley, Department of History.
This Article is based on a presentation made at the Library of Congress Symposium on
Publishing and Readership in Revolutionary France and America, May 2, 1989.
Editor's note: It is with great pleasure that the Tulane Law Review publishes this piece
on revolutionary copyright law in our May 1990 issue, at the time of the bicentennial of the
United States first copyright law, which passed May 31, 1790.
1. The reports to the revolutionary parliaments of Le Chapelier, see Le Moniteur
Universel, Jan. 15, 1791, reprinted in 7 RfiIMPRESSION DE L'ANCIEN MONITEUR 113, 116-

18 (1860) [hereinafter Report of Le Chapelier], and of Lakanal, see Le Moniteur Universel,
July 21, 1793, reprintedin 17 RtIMPRESSION DE L'ANCIEN MONITEUR, supra, at 169, 176

[hereinafter Report of Lakanal], usually furnish the leading evidence for these kinds of
assertions. As discussed infra subpart III (A), these sources in fact prompt quite different
conclusions.

992

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

ing French copyright scholar states that one of the "fundamental
ideas" of the revolutionary copyright laws is the principle that
"an exclusive right is conferred on authors because their property is the most justified since it flows from their intellectual creation." 2 By contrast, the U.S. Constitution's copyright clause, 3
echoing the English Statute of Anne,4 makes the public's interest
equal, if not superior, to the author's. This clause authorizes the
establishment of exclusive rights of authors as a means to maximize production of and access to intellectual creations. 5
Pursuing this comparison, one might observe that post-revolutionary French laws and theorists portray the existence of an
intimate and almost sacred bond between authors and their
works as the source of a strong literary and artistic property
right.6 Thus, France's leading modem exponent of copyright
theory, the late Henri Desbois, grandly proclaimed: "The
author is protected as an author, in his status as a creator,
because a bond unites him to the object of his creation. In the
French tradition, Parliament has repudiated the utilitarian concept of protecting works of authorship in order to stimulate liter' 7
ary and artistic activity.
By contrast, Anglo-American exponents of copyright law
and policy often have viewed the author's right grudgingly. One
of copyright's reluctant advocates, Lord Macaulay, labeled the
2.

C. COLOMBET, PROPRIfTf LrrrARAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 8 (4th ed. 1988). All

translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
4. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 8. See generally Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (limits on the exclusive rights conferred by the Copyright Act
of 1909); H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) (copyright policy will stimulate
writing and invention); Monta, The Concept of "Copyright" Versus the "'Droitd'Auteur," 32
S. CAL. L. Rv. 177 (1959) (comparison of the Anglo-Saxon concept of copyright to the
French concept).
6. See, e.g., Law of Mar. 11, 1957, No. 57-298, art. 1, 1957 Dalloz, Ligislation [D.L.]
102, Juris-Classeur P6riodique [J.C.P.] No. 31, 22030; Portalis, Speech to Chamber of
Peers (May 25, 1839), quoted in P. RECHT, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR, UNE NOUVELLE

FORME DE PROPRIfTt 49 (1969) (authors' rights in their works are not only "property by
appropriation, but property by nature, by essence, by entirety, by the indivisibility of the
object from the subject"); LAMARTINE, On LiteraryProperty, Report to the Chamber of
Deputies, 1841, in 8 OEUVRES COMPLPTES 394, 405 (Paris 1842) ("the very nature of this
property, entirely personal, entirely moral, entirely united with the creator's thought").
7. H. DFSBois, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR EN FRANCE 538 (3d ed. 1978) (describing

1957 French copyright law); see also Monta, supra note 5, at 178 (the text of the 1957
French law "sounds like the proclamation of the rights of men. These are obviously
proclaimed to be natural rights independent of statute ....").
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institution of copyright as "exceedingly bad,"'8 but was willing to
tolerate it as the means to promote the dissemination of socially
useful works. 9 In this view, copyright should afford authors
control no greater than strictly necessary to induce the author to
perform his part of the social exchange.10
Conceptions of French copyright law as author-oriented
and of Anglo-American copyright law as society-oriented carry
certain corollaries. In general, one may anticipate that the more
author-centered the system, the more protective the copyright
regime will be." And the extent of this author-centrism will
promote some interests over others. For example, some argue
that the different foci of the systems account for the active protection of authors' noneconomic moral rights to receive attribution for and preserve the artistic integrity of their creations in
France, and for the traditional paucity of such safeguards in the
U.S. 12 Similarly, the French perspective will encompass most
13
comfortably works of discernible literary or artistic content,
while the U.S. emphasis on social utility may explain its historically vigorous copyright coverage of works such as compilations
conveying much information but little subjective authorial contribution, 14 as well as its present receptivity to computer pro8. 1 C. MACAULAY, Speech to House of Commons, Feb. 5, 1841, in THE WORKS OF
LORD MACAULAY: SPEECHES, POEMS, & MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 667 (1898).
9. Id. at 661-63.
10. For a modem American exposition of this view, see Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,and Computer Programs,84 HARV.
L. REv. 281, 350-51 (1970).
11. Cf B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 22-25 (1967) (as English
authors perceived themselves more as original creators and less as imitative craftsmen, they
began to assert more claims over their works; the scope of copyright protection accordingly
expanded to cover not only exact copies, but partial copies and adaptations).
12. See, eg., DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of
Artists'Rights in Franceand the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 51-56 (1980)
(comparison of the French droit d'auteur to American copyright); Kwall, Copyright and
the Moral Right: Is an American MarriagePossible?, 38 VAND. L. Rav. 1, 9-16 (1985)
(comparison of artistic protection in the U.S. and Europe); Note, An Author's Artistic
Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1492-96 (1979)
(comparison of American copyright system to civil-law moral-rights system).
13. See, e.g., C. CARREAU, MtfRITE ET Dxorr D'AUTEUR (1981); Desjeux, Logiciel,
jeux viddo, et droit d'auteur, EXPERTISES, Nov. 1984, at 277; cf Dillenz, Qu'est-ce que le
droit d'auteur et pourquoi l'appliquons-nous?, 59 IL DIRITTO DI AUTORE 349, 356 (1988)
("Who could truly assert, for example, that an advertising jingle, the instructions for a
board game or a sample of wall paper belong to the 'most sacred and most personal of
properties,' as Le Chapelier [proponent of the first revolutionary copyright law] did not
hesitate to assert respecting works forming the subject matter of copyright?").
14. See, eg., Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 F. 703, 731 (C.C.D. Mass. 1896) (protecting book of
credit ratings and financial standings of stone dealers and manufacturers in U.S. and
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gram protection.
Another consequence of different copyright conceptions
pertains to the role of formalities. Formalities are state-imposed
conditions on the existence or exercise of copyright. If copyright
is essentially a governmental incentive program, many formal
prerequisites may accompany the grant. For example, requiring
the author to affix a notice of copyright, or to register and
deposit copies of the work with a government agency, before the
right will be recognized or enforced is fully consistent with a
public-benefit view of copyright. But these requirements clash
with a characterization of copyright as springing from the creative act. If copyright is born with the work, then no further state
action should be necessary to confer the right; the sole relevant
act is the work's creation.
Despite these paradigms, the differences between the U.S.
and French copyright systems are neither as extensive nor as
venerable as typically described. 15 In particular, despite the conCanada); Brightley v. Littleton, 37 F. 103, 104 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1888) (sustaining copyright
protection of blank forms); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619-20 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(No. 4436) (holding arithmetic book copyrightable).
15. The present differences between the systems are fast becoming muted. In 1985
France enacted computer program protection in terms reminiscent of the U.S. system,
including the virtual exclusion of employee-creators from copyright ownership and the
drastic curtailment of their moral rights. Law of July 3, 1985, arts. 45, 46, 1985 DallozSirey, Ligislation [D.S.L.] 356, J.C.P. No. 59, 57400. In 1987 France's highest civil-law
court rejected copyright infringement challenges to the creation of certain data bases
referencing and to some extent copying from pre-existing works. The court's and the First
Advocate's rationales for curtailing the scope of the copyright in the referenced works
recall analyses of U.S. courts under our "fair use" doctrine. CompareJudgment of Oct. 30,
1987, Cass. ass. plan., 135 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AuTEUR [R.I.D.A.] 78

(1988) (unauthorized computerized index with summaries of, and excerpts from Le Monde)
with New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977)
(unauthorized computerized subindex to the New York Times Index excused on fair use
grounds). See generally Ginsburg, French Copyright Law: A Comparative Overview, 36 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y 269, 281-83 (1989) (discussing the two decisions).

On the United States side of the copyright rapprochement, in 1988 the U.S. modified
its copyright law to join the Berne Convention, an international copyright treaty in which
the standards reflect more French than Anglo-American copyright precepts. Thus, the
U.S. now virtually has abandoned formalities as a condition of the existence or exercise of
copyright and has asserted that it affords authors adequate protection of their moral rights.
See generally Ginsburg & Kemochan, One Hundredand Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins
the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (1988) (discussing changes in U.S.
copyright law as a result of U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention). While the latter
point remains debatable, U.S. courts have displayed an increased willingness to approach
and favorably resolve questions about creators' interests in attribution and artistic integrity.
See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd,
109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989) (raising issues of art object owner's compliance with artist's interests
in attribution and integrity); Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
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ventional portrayal, the French revolutionary laws did not articulate or implement a conception of copyright substantially
different from that of the regimes across the Channel and across
the Atlantic. 16 The French revolutionary sources themselves
cast doubt upon the assumed author-centrism of the initial
French copyright legislation. The speeches in the revolutionary
assemblies, the texts of the laws, and the court decisions construing the laws, all indicate at least a strong instrumentalist undercurrent to the French decrees of 1791 and 1793.17 Similarly,
while the law of U.S. letters predominantly reflects and implements utilitarian policies, U.S. law was not impervious to
authors' claims of personal right. Indeed, some of the earliest
U.S. state copyright laws set forth author-oriented rationales of
which any modem Frenchman would be proud-and from
which some revolutionary
legislators might have drawn consid18
erable inspiration.
This Article examines the rhetoric and policies of the first
French and U.S. copyright laws as well as their application in
practice. Initially, I briefly review printing privileges under the
ancien rdgime. Next, I examine the early Anglo-American copyright regime, with particular reference to the policies underlying
the first U.S. copyright statute, and the works it covered. I then
(discussing author's integrity interests in right of first publication); Lamothe v. Atlantic
Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing co-author's right to
claim attribution when all credit given to another co-author); Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14,
24-25 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing scriptwriters' right of integrity when television program is
edited heavily by broadcaster). Further recognition of moral rights may yet emerge from
our federal legislature. See, e.g., H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (rights of
attribution and integrity for certain works of visual arts); REPORT OF THE REG. OF
COPYRIGHTS, TECHNOLOGICAL ALTERATIONS TO MOTION PICTURES (1989).
16. Cf. S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1996, at 5-6 & n.11 (1987) (quoting J. KASE,
COPYRIGHT THOUGHT IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 8 (1971)):
It will be seen that both these [French revolutionary] laws placed authors' rights
on a more elevated basis than the [English] Act of Anne had done. There was a
conscious philosophical basis to the French laws that saw the rights protected as
being embodied in natural law. Accordingly, the laws were simply according
formal recognition to what was already inherent in the "very nature of things."
17. See generally C. Hesse, Res Publicata: The Printed Word in Paris 1789-1810
(dissertation presented to Princeton Univ. Oct. 1986) (discussed infra) (consideration of
other primary sources supporting this conclusion).
18. See, eg., Mass. Act of Mar. 17, 1783, reprintedin COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1906, COPYRIGHT OFFICE BULLETIN No. 3, at 11 (1906)
[hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. No. 3]. Pierre Recht suggests that a key phrase of

this law's preamble was taken up by the reporter of the 1791 French law. P. RECHT, supra
note 6, at 26.
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turn to the parliamentary speeches and texts of the French 1791
and 1793 decrees. Finally, I consider the French court decisions
through 1814 construing the revolutionary copyright laws. This
examination will demonstrate that the principles and goals
underlying the revolutionary French copyright regime were far
closer to their U.S. counterparts than most comparative law
treatments (or most domestic French law discussions) generally
acknowledge. The first framers of copyright laws, both in
France and in the U.S., sought primarily to encourage the creation of and investment in the production of works furthering
national social goals.
This study stops at the end of the Napoleonic era, substantially before the development of personalist doctrines, such as
moral rights, by French copyright scholars and courts. These
doctrines did provoke theoretical and practical divergences
between the French and U.S. copyright regimes.19 But the later
occurrences of a conceptual breach between the two copyright
systems should not obscure the significance of their initial similarities. Recognizing this early congruence is important for several reasons.
First, in addition to the inherent interest the subject of comparative eighteenth-century copyright may hold, there is some
value to setting the historical record straight. Second, historical
accuracy may promote future legislative harmonization; now
that increasing U.S. participation in international copyright
agreements and policy-making bodies calls key features of the
U.S. copyright system into discussion, one can properly argue
that U.S. copyright has not always been different from that of its
Continental partners. The comparison of systems shows that
their distinctions are neither original nor immutable. A copyright regime's initial instrumentalist formulation does not preclude later reception of more personalist notions of protection.
By the same token, a modern author-oriented copyright system's
reference to its utilitarian past may assist its absorbtion of newer
productions perhaps remote from the core of the beaux arts.

19. These doctrines emerged surprisingly late, at the end of the 19th and the
beginning of the 20th centuries. See generally P. REcTrr, supra note 6.
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COPYRIGHT BEFORE 1791 (MODELS AVAILABLE TO
FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY LEGISLATORS)

Ancien Rigime

Since the late Renaissance the French Crown regulated the
publishing industry; publishing monopolies were an offshoot of
royal censorship. The author, or more often, the publisher or
bookseller, applied for permission to publish the work and
sought the privilege of holding the exclusive right of its publication.2 0 Under the edicts of 1777-78, the Crown afforded printing
privileges to both authors and printers. The author's privilege
was perpetual, but once ceded to the publisher, or if initially
acquired
21 by the publisher, it lasted only during the life of the
author.

By the end of the ancien rdg'me, much rhetoric pro-

claiming the sanctity and self-evidence of exclusive literary property rights had infiltrated the copyright debate, most of it
propounded by publishers invoking authors' rights for the publishers' benefit,22 some of it by government advocates invoking
authors' rights to curb publishers' assertions.23
The system of printing privileges was conditioned upon
compliance with formalities: deposit of copies in national libraries, inclusion of the text of the privilege in each printed copy,
and registration of copies with the publishers' guild.2 4 Remedies
afforded by the privilege included injunctions and damages, as
well as seizure, confiscation, and destruction of infringing copies.25 In addition to controlling the right to publish the work,
20. On regulation of publishing under the ancien rigime, see generally M.-C. DOCK,
ETUDE SUR LE DROrr D'AUTEUR (1963); H. FALK, LES PRIVILtGES DE LIBRAIRIE SOUS
L'ANCIEN RPGIME (1906 & photo. reprint 1970); E. LABOULAYE & G. GUIFFREY, LA
PROPRItTf LITTIfRAIRE AU XVIIIE SItCLE (Paris 1859); M.-F. MALAPERT, HISTOIRE
ABREGfE DE LA LGISLATION SUR LA PROPRItTf LITrtRAIRE AVANT 1789 (1881);

Birn, The Profits of Ideas: Privileges en librairie in Eighteenth-Century France, 4 18THCENTURY STUD. 131 (1971); Henrion, Appoint d 1'dtude des privileges de librairies aux
XVIe et XVIIe siecles, 6 R.I.D.A. 113 (1955).
21. Edict of Aug. 30, 1777, on Privileges arts. 4, 5, reprintedin E. LABOULAYE & G.
GUIFFREY, supra note 20, at 143, 145 [hereinafter Edict on Privileges].
22. See, e.g., the 1777 petition of the advocate Cochu on behalf of the Paris
publishers, reprintedin E. LABOULAYE & G. GUIFFREY, supra note 20, at 159-98. Cochu
contended, "If there is one property which is sacred, self-evident, incontestable, it is
doubtless that of authors in their works." Id. at 160. This and similar rhetoric would be
echoed in the revolutionary assemblies. See infra text accompanying note 64.
23. See Procds-Verbal Concernant la Librairie, excerpted in E. LABOULAYE & G.
GUIFFREY, supra note 20, at 463-596.
24. Edict on Privileges, supra note 21, at 143-47.
25. See Edict of Aug. 30, 1777, on Infringement, reprinted in E. LABOULAYE & G.
GUIFFREY, supra note 20, at 147-50.
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the Crown also regulated rights of public performance of dramatic works by vesting in the Comdie Franqaisethe exclusive
right to perform such works.26
B. Anglo-American Copyright
1. Statute of Anne (1710)
England was the first nation to substitute a statutory rule of
copyright law for a regime of royal favor. Known as the Statute
of Anne, the first copyright statute was enacted in 1710.27 Its
title and preamble enunciate the policy that became the essential
rationale for both English and American copyright laws: copyright is an incentive to authors to create so that the public may
have access to and be enriched by their works. 28 The Statute of
Anne is titled "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by
vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies." '29 Its preamble states that the Act is to discourage piracy and is "for the Encouragement of learned Men to
compose and write useful Books."' 30 The statute sought to
accomplish these goals by conferring a reproduction right on
authors for fourteen years, 31 renewable for another fourteen, if
the author was still living. 32 The Act imposed the formalities of
registration and deposit of copies as prerequisites to protection.33
Remedies included destruction of infringing copies and
damages.34
The Late Eighteenth-Century U.S. Copyright System
The United States Constitution, drafted in 1787, and available in France in Philip Mazzei's French translation by at the
latest 1790, authorizes a national copyright regime. In terms
reminiscent of the Statute of Anne's incentive and access policy,
2.

26. On the rights of dramatic authors and the Comddie Frangaiseunder the ancien
rdgime, see, eg., J. BONCOMPAIN, AuTEURS ET COM9DIENS AU XVIIIE SIPCLE (1976); J.
BoNNAssIEs, LES AUTEURS DRAMATIQUES ET LA COMP-DIE FRAN;AISE AUX XVIIE ET

XVIIIE SIPCLES (1874 & photo. reprint 1970).
27. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19.

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id at title and preamble.
Id. at title.
Id. at preamble.
Id.

32. Id. §I.

33. Id. § II.
34. Id. § V. On the Statute of Anne and its history, see, e.g., L. PATTERSON,
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
COPYRIGHT STATUTE (1956).

143-50 (1968);

H.

RANSOM,

THE FIRST
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the Constitution declares "Congress shall have Power... to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."" Later authorities
have claimed that this phrasing subordinates the author's interests to the public benefit. For example, a report accompanying
Congress 1909 general revision of the copyright law construes
the Constitutional intent as follows:
Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for
the benefit of the public, such rights are given. Not that any
particular class of citizens, however worthy, may benefit, but
because the policy is believed to be for the benefit of the great
body of people, in that it will stimulate writing and invention to
give some bonus to authors and inventors.3 6
Sources chronologically closer to the Constitution, however, treat the private and public interests more even-handedly.
While records from the Constitutional Convention concerning
the copyright clause are extremely sparse, a document dated
August 18, 1787, notes that the proposed legislative powers were
submitted to the Committee of Detail: "To secure to literary
authors their copy rights for a limited time. To encourage by
proper premiums and provisions the advancement of useful
knowledge and discoveries. 3 7 The referral to the Committee of
Detail thus sets forth the authors' property interest ("their copy
rights") and the public interest in advancement of knowledge as
separate considerations of equal weight. Similarly, in The Federalist Papers, Madison endorsed the copyright clause, asserting,
"The public good fully coincides in both cases [of patents and
3' 8
copyrights] with the claims of individuals.

Sources shortly predating the Constitution also indicate
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
36. H.R. REP. No. 2222, supra note 3, quoted in A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J.
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 14 (3d ed. 1989). For an exposition of the
varying interpretations permitted by the constitutional text, see L. PATTERSON, supra note

34, at 195-96.
37. 1 DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION, H.R. Doc.
No. 398, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 130 (1927), quoted in Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEo. L.J. 109, 112 (1929).
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941); see also
Kauffmann, Exposing the Suspicious Foundationsof Society's Primacy in Copyright Law:
Five Accidents, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381, 403-08 (1986) (challenging the

dominance of a public benefit rationale underlying the constitutional copyright clause);
Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
(1990).
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American acknowledgement of authors' personal claims in addition to utilitarian motivations. Before enactment of the Constitution, protection of literary property was a matter for the states.
In his essay Origin of the Copy-Right Laws in the United States,
Noah Webster recounted the dire state of American education in
1782 and his resulting efforts to persuade state legislatures to
protect publications.39 "[S]chool-books were scarce and hardly
obtainable," Webster recalled. 4° Having himself "compiled two
small elementary books for teaching the English language,"41 he
set off to New Jersey and Pennsylvania to seek copyright protection. The legislatures were not then in session, but Webster
enlisted prominent local academic figures in his cause. A letter
signed by professors at Princeton and the University of Pennsylvania sets the tone of the arguments in favor of copyright.
After praising Webster's two works as "very proper for young
persons in the country," the letter urges:
Every attempt of this nature undoubtedly merits the encouragement of the public; because it is by such attempts that systems of education are gradually perfected in every country, and
the elements of knowledge rendered more easy to be acquired.
Men of industry or of talents in any way, have a right to the
property of their productions; and it encourages invention and
improvement to secure it to them by certain laws, as has been
practiced in European countries with advantage and success.
And it is my opinion that it can be of no evil consequence to
the state, and may be of benefit to it, to vest, by a law, the sole
right of publishing and vending such works in the authors of
them.42
While stressing the manifold benefits to public instruction
flowing from protecting authors, Webster's fellow copyright lobbyists also invoked, on behalf of authors, the general Lockean
principle that a property right arises out of one's labors. This
mixed argumentation also emerges in the state copyright statutes
that followed from both Webster's efforts and the next year's
39. N. WEBSTER, Origin of the Copy-Right Laws in the United States, in A
COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON POLITICAL, LITERARY AND MORAL SUBJECTS

173 (N.Y.

1843 & B. Franklin ed. photo. reprint 1968)./The reader might conclude from Webster's
account that he was virtually single-handedly responsible for the enactment of copyright

laws, not only by the states before 1790, but also by Congress in 1831.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 173-74 (quoting letter of Samuel S. Smith (Sept. 27, 1782)); cf.Report of
Lakanal, supra note 1, at 176 (calling copyright "a right whose increase can neither harm
republican equality, nor offend liberty").
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Continental Congress resolution encouraging the thirteen states
to pass copyright laws. 43 For example, the preamble to the Massachusetts Act of March 17, 1783, first announced a public benefit rationale drawn from the English precedent, but then stated:
As the principal encouragement such persons can have to make
great and beneficial exertions of this nature, must exist in the
legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and as such security is one of the natural rights of all
men, there being no property more peculiarly a man's own
than that which is procured by the labor of his mind.'
The first U.S. copyright statute, however, adopted a narrower view of authors' rights. The statute's title, "An Act for
the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps,
charts and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies,
during the times therein mentioned, ' 45 suggests Congress intent
to employ copyright as a means of furthering public education.
The statute granted protection in these works to the author or
his assigns for fourteen years, renewable for another fourteen, if
43. See "Resolution passed by the colonial Congress, Recommending the several
States to secure to the Authors or Publishers of New Books the Copyright of such Books,"
May 2, 1783, reprintedin COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. No. 3, supra note 18, at 11.
44. Mass. Act of Mar. 17, 1783, reprinted in COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. No. 3, supra
note 18, at 14; see also N.H. Act of Nov. 7, 1783, reprintedin COPYRIGHT OFF.BULL. No.
3, supra note 18, at 18-19; R.I. Act of Dec. 1783, reprintedin COPYRIGHT OFF.BULL. No.
3, supra note 18, at 19-20.
The organization of the Connecticut statute places the author's personal rights before
the public's. It states:
Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the principles of natural equity and justice,
that every author should be secured in receiving the profits that may arise from
the sale of his works, and such security may encourage men of learning and
genius to publish their writings; which may do honor to their country, and service
to mankind.
Conn. Act of Jan. 1783, reprinted in COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. No. 3, supra note 18, at 11.
For wording that closely resembles that of the Connecticut statute, see N.C. Act of Nov.
19, 1785, reprintedin COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. No. 3, supra note 18, at 25; Ga. Act of Feb.
3, 1786, reprintedin COPYRIGHT OFF.BULL. No. 3, supra note 18, at 27; and N.Y. Act of
Apr. 29, 1786, reprintedin COPYRIGHT OFF.BULL. No. 3, supra note 18, at 29. Another
source concludes from this organization that "even though encouragement of learning was
included as a reason for these four statutes, the primary purpose seemed to have been the
enforcement of a pre-existing right-a property right in intellectual works." Crawford,
Pre-ConstitutionalCopyright Statutes, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 11, 15 (1975); see also
L. PATTERSON, supra note 34, at 188 ("The dominant idea of copyright underlying the
state statutes was the idea of copyright as an author's right."). But see I J. TEBBEL, A
HISTORY OF BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CREATION OF AN INDUSTRY 1630-1865, at 139 (1972) (pointing out that the Connecticut statute "gave the Superior

Court the right to withdraw copyright if the author did not 'furnish the Public with sufficient Editions' of a book").
45. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
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the author was still living.46 The Act imposed the formalities of
registration and deposit of copies, together with affixation of a
notice of copyright, as prerequisites to protection. 47 Remedies
included forfeiture of infringing copies and damages. 48
C. For What Kinds of Works Was Anglo-American Copyright
Sought or Litigated?
The works generating the subject matter of copyright
deposits and claims reflect the general universe of late eighteenth-century American publications. Perhaps not suprisingly
for a young republic, instructive, civics-oriented works dominate
the publishing catalogues. For example, examination of the
5368 publications (including newspapers and pamplets) listed in
the 1790-92 and 1798-99 volumes of Charles Evans's American
Bibliography indicates that republican publishing habits corresponded to the "new republican ideology [that] defin[ed] the virtuous citizen as one who was broadly informed about political
doctrine and public affairs." 4 9 Evans's records for these years
show 540 newspapers (157 newspapers for 1790-92, 383 for
1798-99), 441 titles in Political Science (207 for 1790-92, 234 for
1798-99), 302 titles in History (117 for 1790-92, 185 for 179899), 270 titles in Social Science (125 for 1790-92, 145 for 179899), and 61 Fourth of July orations for 1798-99. By contrast, the
publication of novels appears fairly modest: 43 titles for 1790-92
and 119 for 1798-99. 50 This relative paucity of fiction also may
46. Id. § 1.
47. Id. § 3. Formalities often proved fatal to U.S. authors' or publishers' claims. See,
e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. [8 Pet.] 591 (1834) (failure to comply with registration
requirements); Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872) (news
bulletins held uncopyrightable because unamenable to compliance with formalities). For
an argument that the onerous formalities established by the 1790 Federal Copyright Act
"betrayed" U.S. authors, see Ringer, Copyright in Retrospect: Authors' Rights in Prospect,
14 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS - (forthcoming 1990).

48. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124, § 2. Neither the English nor the U.S. laws
provided in the 18th century for a right of public performance.
49. Brown, Afterword: From Cohesion to Competition, in PRINTING AND SOCIETY IN
EARLY AMERICA 300, 305 (1983).
50. The classifications are those of Evans. 8 C. EVANS, AMERICAN BIBLIOGRAPHY

414, 416-20 (1941) (covering 1790-92); 12 id. at 389-91, 294-97 (1942) (covering 1798-99).
For general bibliographical information concerning late 18th-century publishing in
America, see, e.g., 9-11 id. (covering 1793-97); C. SHIPTON & J.MOONEY, NATIONAL
INDEX OF AMERICAN IMPRINTS THROUGH 1800: THE SHORT-TITLE EVANS (1969);
Brigham, American Booksellers' Catalogues, 1734-1800, in ESSAYS HONORING LAWRENCE
C. WROTH 31 (1951).

English authors wrote mfich of the fiction; the titles published in the U.S. in 1790-92
included three editions of Defoe's Robinson Crusoe; two each of Fielding's Tom Jones and
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reflect republican values. Thomas Jefferson stated, "A great
obstacle to good education is the inordinate passion prevalent
for novels, and the time'51lost in that reading which should be
instructively employed.
A review of the copyright records casts light on the smaller
universe of works of actual or perceived economic value5 2 and
allows comparison of government policy in enacting the copyright incentive to the kinds of works for which authors and publishers in fact accepted the government's offer. Copyright
practice apparently met policy goals-copyright was sought for
the socially useful, instructive works that Congress had intended
to encourage.
Petitions to Congress before enactment of the first copyright statute sought exclusive privileges for works overwhelmingly instructional in character. For example, on May 12, 1789,
Jedediah Morse petitioned for exclusive rights in The American
Geography, or a View of the present Situation of the United States
of America embellished and illustratedwith two original maps,
and on June 8, 1789, one Nicholas Pike, of Massachusetts,
sought a privilege for A new and complete System of Arithmetic.5 3 A recent comprehensive study of copyright deposit records
covering the first ten years of the federal copyright system disJoseph Andrews; three of Goldsmith's Vicar of Wakefield; and one each of Richardson's
Pamela, ClarissaHarlow, and Sir Charles Grandison. See 8 C. EVANS, supra, at 416-17.
None of these could have been copyrighted in the U.S. because the first U.S. copyright
statute (and all subsequent statutes until 1891, see 26 Stat. 1106) limited protection to U.S.
works. U.S. publishers thus freely pirated English works, particularly novels. In the 19th
century, Dickens and Trollope complained bitterly of such American practices. Out of
creative solidarity and economic self-interest, American novelists also objected to the lack
of protection for foreign works: pirate editions of English works undercut or depressed the
price of their works. See Sandison, The Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention: The American Experience, 11 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 89, 92-93 (citing works).
51. 15 T. JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 166 (1903), quoted in
FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-1800 xxii (J. Gilreath ed. 1987).

52. Tebbel notes the "rather small" proportion of copyright registrations (556) to
books published (13,000 titles recorded in Charles Evans's American Bibliography)during
the first nine years of the federal statute. J. TEBBEL, supra note 44, at 142. Tebbel
concludes: "Obviously, the idea and opportunity of copyright were not grasped by
everyone overnight." Id. See generally FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-1800, supra

note 51.
53. See Proceedingsin Congress Duringthe Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First
Patentand CopyrightLaws, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 243, 247-49 (1940) (reproducing the text
of the petitions). Morse's work became the first to be deposited for federal copyright
pursuant to the 1790 statute in the state of Massachusetts. Tebbel states that Morse's and
Pike's works "may safely be said to be 'first' among [American] schoolbooks." J. TEBBEL,
supra note 44, at 196.
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closes a preponderance of useful, instructional texts in deposits
made pursuant to the first federal copyright statute. 54 For example, of eighty copyright deposits recorded from 1790 through
1792 in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts (the states in which
most works were published), thirty-four were of grammars,
geographies, or similar instructional texts and another twentysix comprised informational works such as histories and almanacs. One scholar of publishing history attributes the dominance of textbooks in copyright registers in part to Noah
Webster's efforts,5 5 and in part to national pride: "In the postRevolution textbook boom, the demand for primers, geographies
and arithmetics, in both German and English, was high, as
American books patriotically replaced the British texts that had
been used before."' 56 The titles of several of the instructional
works deposited for copyright convey their personally and patriotically uplifting aims. For example, Jedediah Morse titled
another work, registered for federal copyright in Massachusetts
on July 10, 1790, as follows: Geography made easy; being an
Abridgement of the American Geography,-to which is added a
geographicalAccount of the Eurpoean settlements in America &
of Europe, Asia & Africa; illustrated with eight neat maps and
[woodcuts-calculatedparticularlyfor the use & improvement of
Schools in the United States; and Noah Webster titled one of his
numerous educational endeavors, registered for federal copyright in Massachusetts on October 7, 1790, as follows: An American selection of lessons in reading and speaking. Calculated to
improve the minds and refine the taste of youth. And also, to
instruct7them in the geography, history, andpolitics of the United
5
States.
U.S. copyright litigation, albeit sparse, seemingly also was
54. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-1800, supra note 51; see also Goff, The
'First Decade of the Federal Act for Copyright, 1790-1800, in ESSAYS HONORING
LAWRENCE C. WROTH, supra note 50, at 101, 103 (pointing out preponderance of

textbooks in early copyright registrations).
55. Of 69 titles on the English language published during 1790 to 1792, 23 were by
Webster. 8 C. EVANS, supra note 50, at 415.
56. J. TEBBEL, supra note 44, at 142. Webster himself reaped the benefits both of his
efforts to promote copyright and of nationalism. His spelling book "was a revolt against
. . . everything the British grammars represented. Webster's spelling, usage and

pronunciations were American. Its sales were phenomenal; only the Bible has ever
surpassed it to this day [1972]." Id. at 198.
57. These works are, catalogued as Nos. 265 and 267 in FEDERAL COPYRIGHT
RECORDS 1790-18 10, supra note 51, at 74. I have taken the title of Webster's work from
entry No. 23050 in Evans's American Bibliography. See 8 C. EVANS, supra note 50, at 103.
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reserved to quarrels over informational and similar works. A
leading study has cited no copyright decisions before 1791, and
only two lower court decisions58 between that time and the U.S.
Supreme Court's first copyright decision, Wheaton v. Peters,59 in
1834. 60 Both lower court cases concerned compliance with federal copyright formalities. Both also concerned works more of
utility and of laborious compilation than of imagination-in one,
a "federal calculator," and in the other, a Pharmacopoeiaof the
United States of America. Wheaton v. Peters involved a court
reporter's claim of copyright in reports of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions.61
III.
A.

THE FRENCH ENACTMENTS OF 1791 TO 1793

Revolutionary Copyright Politics: CriticalDiscussion of the
Legal Texts and Their Legislative History
While traditional comparisons of French to Anglo-Ameri-

58. Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824) (No. 4584) and Nichols v.
Ruggles, 3 Day 145 (Conn. 1808), cited in L. PATrERSON, supra note 34, at 207 (1968).
59. 33 U.S. [8 Pet.] 591 (1834).
60. I have found two other federal copyright decisions predating Wheaton v. Peters.
However, both postdate the French Revolution. See Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872) (financial reports); Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1580) (navigation charts). Clayton v. Stone nonetheless is worth
signaling for its restrictive interpretation of the term "book" in the 1790 copyright act. The
court denied copyright protection to market reports published in daily newspapers on the
ground that "books" imply some permanent contribution to knowledge; newspapers are
too "ephemeral." 5 F. Cas. at 1003. Moreover, stressed the court, the daily publication of
newspapers makes them ill-adapted to compliance with the extensive statutory formalities.
It followed that Congress could not have meant to include newspapers. Id.
61. Useful works also predominate in English copyright decisions predating the
French revolutionary laws. See, eg., Trusler v. Murray, 1 East 362 n.b., 102 Eng. Rep. 140
n.b. (K.B. 1789) (book of chronology); Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361 n.b., 102 Eng. Rep. 139
n.b. (K.B. 1785) (sea charts); Carnan v. Bowles, 2 Bro. C.C. 80, 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch. 1786)
(road atlases); Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 3 Atk. 296, 26 Eng. Rep.
957, Barn. Ch. 368, 27 Eng. Rep. 682 (Ch. 1740) (law books). This condition continued in
subsequent years. Augustine Birrell, the Victorian law professor and Member of
Parliament, surveyed 19th-century English copyright cases, observing,
In reading the cases in the Reports for the last hundred years, you cannot
overlook the literary insignificance of the contending volumes. The big authors
and big books stand majestically on one side-the combatants are all small fry.
The question of literary larceny is chiefly illustrated by disputes between bookmakers and rival proprietors of works of reference, sea charts, Patteson's
"Roads," the antiquities of Magna Graecia, rival encyclopaedias, gazetteers,
guide books, cookery books, law reports, post office and trade directories,
illustrated catalogues of furniture, statistical returns, French and German
dictionaries, Poole's farce, "Who's Who?" [and] Brewer's "Guide to Science."
A. BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS

170-71 (1899).
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can copyright law assert that France rejected instrumentalist
theories in favor of copyright as the just and fair prerogative of
creators, research in primary sources prompts a different conclusion. The various legislative texts reveal a hesitating and uneven
progress toward protection of authors' rights. Authors are not
securely at the core of the new literary property regime; rather,
the public plays a major role. The 1791 text predominantly is
preoccupied with the recognition and enlargement of the public
domain. The committee report in favor of the 1793 law emphasizes that protecting authors will not prove detrimental to
society.
In the 1791 decree, the author's concerns do not occupy
center stage. The report on the 1791 decree arose in a dispute
between dramatists and the Comddie Frangaise-thelatter once
the beneficiary of the exclusive right to produce theatrical works,
the former once effectively indentured to the only approved theater. The decree's main goal was to proclaim the right of all
citizens to open their own theaters and to produce plays, as the
decree's first article states. Authors' rights are an adjunct to this
freedom; just as any citizen may be a theatrical producer, so may
any living author (or one dead for up to five years) be produced
anywhere he wishes to be produced and only where he wishes to
be produced. Plays by authors dead over five years are declared
part of the public domain. The decree thus was designed to
break the Comddie Franqaise'smonopoly on the works of Corneille, Moliere, and Racine.62 Seen in its overall context, the
decree's recognition of authors' rights principally was a means to
terminate that monopoly.
It bears emphasis that the authors' rights are hardly ascendant. The reporter, Le Chapelier, is often quoted as a great
exponent of author-oriented rationales for copyright. But
almost invariably, the passage quoted is taken out of context.63
62. The Comddiens had indicated their willingness to relinquish monopoly rights in
the works of living authors, but invoked the principle of nonretroactivity of new laws to
insist on their continuing rights in long-deceased playwrights, such as those mentioned in
the text (who, not incidentally, constituted the core of the repertory). See Report of Le
Chapelier, supra note 1, at 116.
63. See, e.g., M.-C. DOCK, supra note 20, at 152; A. FRANgON, COURS DE
PROPRItTA LrrrRAIRE, ARTISTIQUE ET INDUSTRIELLE 15-16 (1980); E. POUILLET,
TRAITI THfORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA PROPRITA LITTARAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 26 n. 1

(3d ed. 1908).
Pouillet may have relied on several earlier treatise writers, whose incomplete
quotations from Le Chapelier supply apparent evidence for an author-oriented concept of
copyright. See, e.g., M.

GASTAMBIDE, HISTORIQUE ET THtORIE DE LA PROPRIf-Tf- DES
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Le Chapelier did declare that "the most sacred, the most legitimate, the most unassailable, and ... the most personal of all
properties, is the work which is the fruit of a writer's
thoughts." 64 But he said it respecting unpublished works. Once
disseminated, Le Chapelier went on to assert, the manuscript is
"give[n] over to the public.., by the nature of things, everything is finished for the author and the publisher when the public
'65
has in this way [through publication] acquired the work.
According to Le Chapelier, the main principle is the public
domain, to which authors' rights are an exception. He stressed
that the new French law must put the principle and its exception
in the right place; were the exception to replace the principle
that "a published work is by its nature a public property," then
"you will no longer have any basis for your law."' 66 Indeed, he
criticized the English copyright law for setting up a strongly
protected right rather than appreciating the principle of the public domain.
The text of the 1791 law followed Le Chapelier's organization of principles and exceptions: 67 Article 1 pronounced the
right of all citizens to erect theaters and to perform plays of all
kinds; article 2 declared that works of authors who have been
dead for over five years are public property; not until article 3
did the 1791 law set forth affirmative authors' rights by conditioning performances of the works of living authors upon their
written consent.68
A subsequent decree on playwrights' copyright, handed
AtrrEuRs 47 n. I (Paris 1862) (quoting Le Chapelier); A. NION, DROITS CIVILS DES
AtrrEuRs, ARTISTES ET INVENTEURS 39-40 (Paris 1846).
64. Report of Le Chapelier, supra note 1, at 117.
65. Id. Le Chapelier's remark that "in the nature of things," publication marks the
demise of authors' and publishers' rights thus rejects assertions of an inherent postpublication property right in literary works. Others would echo this position. See, e.g.,
Judgment of Jan. 20, 1818, Cass. crim., 52 Journal du Palais Recueil de la Jurisprudence [J.
Pal.] 5 (pleading of defendant's advocate), quoted in 4 M. MERLIN, RECUEIL
ALPHABtTIQUE DE QUESTIONS DE Daorr 340-42 (4th ed. 1828). The defendant argued
that neither natural law nor customary law accords to authors the exclusive right to
reproduce their published works, but rather a "specific law grants this right, which
derogates from the natural right acquired by all [to copy] as of the first publication of the
work." Id.at 341.
Eighteenth-century English copyright case law construing the Statute of Anne also
distinguished between published and unpublished works. See Donaldson v. Beckett,
reported in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2408-17, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 257-66 (1774).
66. Report of Le Chapelier, supra note 1, at 117.
67. See id. at 118.
68. The sanction for unauthorized performances was confiscation of all revenues from
the performances and their award to the authors. Article IV states the extent of the new
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down on August 30, 1792, also reflected Le Chapelier's weak
embrace of authors' rights. The January 1791 decree had not
satisfied the authors' demands. The public's right to establish
theaters had come into conflict with the dramatists' right to
authorize public performances; particularly in the provinces,
theater owners were producing plays without paying the authors
the full sums demanded. Beaumarchais petitioned the Assemblie Nationale for a law that would better assure authors' property interests. The resulting decree announced in the preamble
that "the right to publish and the right to public performance,
which incontestably belong to the authors of dramatic works,
have not
been sufficiently distinguished and protected by the
9
law."

'6

However, the actual articles of the 1792 decree made dramatists' public performance rights even more vulnerable than
under the 1791 decree. The 1792 decree subjected dramatist's
rights to compliance with formalities. It imposed on the author
the burden, at the time of the play's publication, to notify the
public that the author had retained the public performance
right. Articles 4 through 6 declared that the notice must be
printed at the head of the text of the play and deposited with a
notary. Unless these conditions were fulfilled, the dramatist's
right would never vest.
Moreover, article 8 of the decree
declared that plays could be freely performed at the expiration of
ten years following publication. In substituting a ten-year term
for the 1791 decree's life plus five years, the 1792 measure may
have shortened the duration of many playwrights' protection.7 1
law's retroactive effect. Article V confers a five-year post-mortem right on dramatists' heirs

or grantees.
69. The text of the 1792 law, which is printed in the collected laws from June 1789 to
August 1830, BULLETIN ANNOTP, DES LOIS, DtCRETS ET ORDONNANCES (Paris 1834), does
not include the preamble. It is set forth in Baudin, Rapport et projet de ddcret sur la
proprit des auteursdramatiques,prsents au nom du comitJde l'instructionpublique, in I
PROCPiS

VERBAUX

DU

CoMrr

D'INSTRUCTION

PUBLIQUE

DE

LA

CONVENTION

NATIONALE 349, 353 (M. Guillaume ed. 1891) [hereinafter PROCPtS VERBAUX].
70. The 1792 law thus harks back to the printing press reglement of 1723 governing
publishing and bookselling: article 103 conditioned issuance of printing privileges on
publication of the text of the privilege at the front or back of each copy; article 108 required
deposit of copies in the royal libraries. See E. LABOULAYE & G. GIUFFREY, supra note 20,
at 3, 5-7.
71. This 1792 decree, volubly resented by dramatists, was repealed by the Decree of
Sept. 1, 1793. See 2 PROCtS VERBAUX, supra note 69, at 353 (1894). Concerning the
dramatists' efforts before the revolutionary legislature, see generally Fragmentsd'histoirede
la protectionlittiraire,la lutte entre les auteurs dramatiqueset les directeursde thidtressous

l'Assemblde ligislativeFranqaise(1791-92), LE DRorr D'AUTEUR, Oct. 15, 1890, at 105-10.

1990]

TALE OF TWO COPYRIGHTS

1009

By 1793, however, the revolutionary legislators' copyright
rhetoric had shifted away from Le Chapelier's public domain
principle toward recognizing a property right in authors' works
even after publication. But this shift did not markedly amend
the prior reserved characterization of authors' rights, much less
break with it. In the new formulation, authors would still not
receive protection primarily for their own sake, but recognition
of their rights would serve to promote the public welfare.
Indeed, jurisdiction over elaboration of a copyright law had been
transferred from the Committees on the Constitution and on
Agriculture and Commerce to the Committee on Public Instruction. 72 Enacting a copyright law formed part of a grander
scheme of public education.
The report of Lakanal,73 on behalf of the Committee of
Public Instruction, at first signaled a more favorable attitude
towards authors' rights. This document (which, like Le Chapelier's report, is often quoted selectively) announced in its first
sentence a property right in works of authorship. 74 Lakanal also
dubbed the proposed law the "Declaration of the Rights of
Genius," thus stressing copyright's kinship to other great Rights
of Man. 7" But other aspects of the report reveal ambiguities.
For example, Lakanal's pronouncement of an author's property
right is guarded. Unlike ancien regime advocates of literary
property, Lakanal did not assert that "the author is the master
'76
of his work, or no one in society is master of his property.
Indeed, unlike Le Chapelier, Lakanal did not even affirm "the
most sacred, . . . the most personal of properties. ' 77 Rather, he
proclaimed that this right is "[o]f all rights the least subject to
criticism, a right whose increase can neither harm republican
equality, nor offend liberty. '7' The rhetoric here displays a
looking-over-the-shoulder quality inconsistent with a firm conviction of the centrality of authors' personal claims. 9
72. See 1 PROCkS VERBAUX, supra note 69, at iv. For a more detailed account of the
shifts in committee responsibility in the revolutionary legislature over copyright legislation,
see generally Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in
Revolutionary France,1777-1793, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 110 (1990).
73. Report of Lakanal, supra note 1, at 176.
74. Id.
75. See generally Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Fr. 1789).
76. Diderot, Sur la libertd de la presse 42, quoted in Birn, supra note 20, at 153.
Diderot made the assertion at the behest of his publisher. Birn, supra note 20, at 152-53.
77. Report of Le Chapelier, supra note 1,at 117.
78. Report of Lakanal, supra note 1, at 176.
79. Interestingly, Pouillet's highly influential copyright treatise quotes this text quite
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Some nineteenth-century commentators buttress this conclusion. For example, in his 1858 study, Etudes Sur la propridtd
Littdraireen France et en Angleterre, Edouard Laboulaye voiced
disappointment that Lakanal's report failed to affirm a true
property right for authors. He charged that in Lakanal's report
"one sees that nothing has changed in ideas, nor in legislation:
the word property, it is true, has replaced that of privilege,
but
80
this property is still but a charitable grant from society.
The text of the 1793 decree also undercuts arguments that
this law protects authors primarily because they are authors.
Although in the version of the decree reported by Lakanal on
July 21 there was no requirement of deposit as a prerequisite to
suit, the final text incorporated the condition. As discussed earlier, 8 ' conditioning the exercise of copyright upon compliance
with formalities undercuts the notion of a right inherent in the
author.82 Several early court decisions under the 1793 law held
that deposit of copies, rather than simply meeting a procedural
requirement, gave rise to the copyright. 83 At the least, failure to
deposit the work could result in an initially protected work's
selectively, removing the more insecure passages, those which claim that copyright will not
harm the Republic. See E. POUILLET, supra note 63, at 14-15. Subsequently, many leading
authors resorted to Pouillet's rendition, rather than to the original text. See, eg., C.
COLOMBET, supra note 2, at 7; A. FRAN§ON, supra note 63, at 16. This confusion has
perpetuated the view that the Revolution perceived copyright as "un v6ritable droit
naturel." Id. (emphasis in original).
80. E. LABOULAYE, ETUDES SUR LA PROPRIfT-T LITnrRAIRE EN FRANCE ET EN
ANGLETERRE xi (1858) (emphasis in original).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
82. This observation is shared by R. CROUZEL, LE DflP6T LUGAL 31 (1936) (quoting
Vaunois, Le dipdt ldgal des imprimis en France, 1916 LE DROIT D'AUTEUR 125, 125-27).
Others also criticized the 1793 deposit requirement, but on different grounds. A
deposit requirement tied to initiation of suit in effect made deposit optional when no
prospect of litigation existed. As a result, the 1793 law deprived the national library of a
sure means to enrich its collections, thus "undermining . . . the progress of arts and
sciences." Cholet de Jetphort, Projet d'organisationde l'imprimerie-librairieet des arts,
itats etprofessions quiy sont attachisou qui en dipendent,adressidSa Majestiempereuret
roi (1807), reprinted in H. LEMAITRE, HISTOIRE DE DfP6T LEGAL, 3d pt., at 82 (1910).
At the same time, the nondeposit- bar to suit "conveys an indirect approval of the
commerce in pirate editions, because, if one does not fulfill the deposit condition, one
cannot pursue the infringer." I'd.
83. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1806, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Recueil Gnral des Lois et des
Arr~ts [Dev. & Car.] 1.299; Judgment of Nov. 26, 1828, Cour royale, Paris, [1828] 9 Dev.
& Car. 2.159.
The Judgment of Jan. 20, 1818, Cass. crim., 52 J. Pal. 5, considered compliance with
formalities as giving rise to exclusive rights. The court stated that the plaintiffs "published
the work in 1816 and fulfilled all the formalities prescribed for acquiring the exclusive right
to sell." Id. at 12-13. The plaintiff's advocate made the same assumption when he
contended that a French national first publishing abroad could nonetheless obtain
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falling into the public domain.84 These rulings suggest a judicial
view that the act of authorship does not itself afford a basis for
recognizing or maintaining protection of authors' rights.
The prominence of the public interest (and the public
domain) in the 1793 law calls to mind Anglo-American notions
of intellectual property. Indeed, an observer closer to the event
noted the similarity. In 1838 Charles-Augustin Renouard,
author of one of the first French copyright treatises, articulated
two opposing philosophies of copyright. According to one,
authors are the absolute owners of their work, both before and
after publication. Their property right is, like all other property
rights, transmissible, perpetual, and inviolable. According to the
other system of copyright thought, authors are
workers and not property owners; if the laws ensure them
exclusive exploitation of their works, it is by virtue of a positive
grant of civil law and of a tacit contract which, at the moment
of publication, intervenes between the public and the author. It
is by the establishment of a privilege, created as a legitimate
and fair compensation, that the full and free exploitation of a
published work is forbidden to all persons composing the public. This is the system of the law of July 19, 1793 .... 15
Renouard pursued his identification of the 1793 law with
instrumentalist legislation, likening the 1793 law to French and
English patent laws, both of which may be characterized as state
grants in exchange for the ultimate enrichment of the public
domain. 86 Others agreed that the 1793 law did not afford
copyright protection in France by completing the formalities to which the privilege is
subject. Id. at 8.
84. In Judgment of Mar. 1, 1834, Cass. crim., 1834 Dev. & Car. 1.65, the Cour de
cassation states that the 1793 law "guarantees literary property, upon condition of deposit
of two copies with the Bibliothbque nationale" and refers to the "loss of that property right
through failure of deposit." I& at 75. As a result of this decision, the question whether
deposit under the 1793 law created, perfected, or merely served to prove, the copyright
became moot: the court held that subsequent enactments (in 1810, 1814, and 1828) had
substituted a different deposit requirement for that set forth in article 6 of the 1793 law.
France required presuit deposit of copies of works of authorship until the beginning of the
20th century.
85. C.-A. RENOUARD, DES DROITS DES AUTEURS SUR LES PRODUITS DE LEUR
INTELLIGENCE 242 (1838).

86. Id.; see also Law of Dec. 31, 1790-Jan. 7, 1791, 6 Dalloz, Ripertoire de
Ldgislation [D.R.L.] 528 n. 1. The law's preamble mixes protective rationales, proclaiming,
Whereas any new idea whose demonstration or development can be useful to
society belongs initially to him who conceived it, and that it would be an attack
upon the rights of man in their essence to fail to deem an industrialdiscovery the
property of its author; whereas the lack of a positive and authentic declaration of
this truth may have contributed up until the present time to discourage French
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authors powerful guarantees of exclusive rights. Thus, parodying the Le Chapelier and Lakanal reports, Laboulaye lamented
that under the 1793 law copyright had become "of
all property
8' 7
rights the most humble and the least protected.
This examination of the legislative sources of the first
French copyright laws reveals that these framers did not greet
the concept of authors' property rights with the enthusiasm that
later writers ascribed to them. Detailed treatment of the political, economic, social, and intellectual reasons behind this
restrained embrace of copyright exceeds the scope of this Article. But two reasons for the framers' reluctance deserve at least
brief notice.88 First, generally the most vociferous advocates for
authors' rights were not authors, but their publishers, or, more
specifically, the Paris Community of Book Sellers and Printers. 9
Arguments for copyright therefore evoked images of guild selfinterest in a period of increasing anticorporatism. Not coincidentally the same legislator who presented the begrudging report
for the 1791 copyright law, Le Chapelier, also sponsored the
1791 law dissolving guilds and corporations; the law's first artiindustry, by causing the emigration of many distinguished inventors and by
causing the loss to foreign countries of a great number of new inventions from
which this empire should have drawn the first advantage.
Id. preamble (emphasis in original). Principles of public access and of the public domain
predominate in the text of the law. See, e.g., id. art. 4 (inventor's obligation to declare the
invention and deposit descriptions; the descriptions become publicly accessible upon issuance of the patent), art. 11 (all citizens may consult patent records and, in principle,
descriptions), art. 15 (upon expiration of the patent, the discovery or invention belongs to
society; all descriptions are rendered public, and anyone may use the invention), art. 16
(circumstances under which patent protection will be withdrawn, including false or incomplete descriptions, or two years of unjustified nonuse of the invention). For a recent discussion of the genesis and fate of the 1790-91 patent law, see Savignon, The French Revolution
and Patents, INDUS. PROP., Nov. 1989, at 391-400.

In England, the Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. I, ch. 3 (1624), set forth the
patent regime still in force at the time of the French Revolution and of Renouard's treatise.
The Statute of Monopolies, primarily designed to eliminate or truncate grants of exclusive
rights, recognized limited patent protection, but set inventors in second place to principles
of free trade. Id See generally B. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 35-40 (1967) (development of English law concerning 'patents of
invention).
87. E. LABOULAYE, supra note 80, at xii.

88. For fuller discussions, see, e.g., Hesse, supra note 72; C. Hesse, supra note 17.
89. See generally Birn, supra note 20 (discussing the legal briefs and memoranda for
representatives of the Paris publishers between 1710 and 1778. Many of these documents
are reprinted in E. LABOULAYE & G. GUIFFREY, supra note 20.).

Authors in England also enjoyed (or endured) the same tainted champions. See
generally, e.g., B. BUGBEE, supra note 86; L. PATTERSON, supra note 34; Rose, The Author

as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Beckett and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23
REPRESENTATIONS 51, 56 (1988).
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cle declared that "the abolition of all kinds of corporations of
citizens of the same occupation and profession is one of the fundamental bases of the French Constitution." 90
Second, and perhaps most importantly, a strong current of
Enlightenment thought objected on instrumentalist grounds to
any assertion of property rights in idea-bearing works: individual proprietary claims would retard the progress of knowledge.
In 1776 a major exponent of this position, Condorcet, published
a pamphlet on freedom of the press opposing not only censorship, but also copyright. 9' Publishers' broadsides had analogized literary property to real property or chattels: an author
owns his writings just as one who tills the field owns the fruits
thereof.92 Condorcet challenged this analogy. He pointed out
what is today called the "public goods" nature of copyright: a
field belongs to only one person; by contrast, a literary work can
belong to and be enjoyed by many simultaneously. Social intervention is needed to create and secure a property interest in such
a work. If society is to intervene, the creation of a privilege must
be necessary, useful, and just. To Condorcet, publishers' privileges, as they had developed by 1776, were none of these; rather,
they concentrated power over books and thus power over ideas
in a few hands. Condorcet therefore concluded that exclusive
rights in literary works diminished, rather than enhanced, public
93
debate.
Condorcet's position was to change. The Revolution's suppression of privileges and the concomitant collapse of the publishers guild did not produce the outpouring of intellectual
creations that might have been expected. In her illuminating
study of the Paris publishing industry, Professor Carla Hesse
observes that while abolition of the guild promoted the publication of pamphlets, broadsides, and works of similarly short
length and timeliness, it also severely undermined the book
trade. 94 This phenomenon led revolutionary thinkers and legislators to perceive a crisis in ideas and letters. Unless some sys90. The Le Chapelier Law of June 14, 1791, translated in 7 UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO READINGS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION: THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH

REVOLUTION 248 (K. Baker ed. 1987).
91. M.J. CONDORCET, Fragments sur la libertd de la presse, in 11 OEUVRES DE
CONDORCET 308-11 (M. Arago ed. Paris 1847).
92. See, e.g., Mimoir of Louis d'Hiricourt, reprinted in E. LABOULAYE & G.
GUIFFREY, supra note 20, at 21-40.
93. M.J. CONDORCET, supra note 91, at 311.
94. C. Hesse, supra note 17, at 165-67.
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tern of incentive and economic security were restored, book
production, and hence the dissemination of the Enlightenment
itself, might cease. Authors' exclusive rights became necessary
to the perpetuation and further flowering of revolutionary ideals.
Professor Hesse asserts that Condorcet as a result collaborated
with the Abb6 Sieyes on a proposed new press law (not passed),
whose articles 14 through 21 stated: "The progress of the
enlightenment, and thus of the public good, join themselves to
ideas of distributive justice, to require that the law assure to
authors the property right in their works." 95 One may conclude
that Condorcet, like Le Chapelier, perceived the public domain
as the principle and copyright as an unhappy exception that
practice had proved necessary and useful. Under this view, a
just copyright law should be no more extensive than required to
promote the public good. Thus, if as I argue, instrumentalist
policies did indeed promote and infuse the revolutionary legislators' recognition of the exclusive right of reproduction, those
policies may have derived from suspicion of proprietary rights in
works of authorship, both as a matter of Enlightenment theory
and antiguild practice.
I do not mean to suggest that French revolutionary legislators perceived copyright solely as a vehicle to foster the public
welfare. Sympathy for authors' claims of moral entitlement to
rights in their works surely influenced enactment of the 1791
and 1793 decrees as well. After all, the revolutionary copyright
laws were drafted and enacted in a general climate formally recognizing natural rights, including the "sacred" right to property
enunciated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man. 96 My point
is that mixed motives underlay the French revolutionary copyright laws (as well as their U.S. counterparts) and that the parliamentary speeches and the texts of the laws themselves attest
to a certain tension between authors' personal claims of right
and the public interest in access to works of authorship. Thus,
without denying the presence of a strong authors' rights current
in the revolutionary laws, I would suggest that the revolutionary
legislators generally resolved that public-versus-private tension
by casting copyright primarily as an aid to the advancement of
public instruction.
95. See 4 HIsTOIRE PARLEMENTAIRE DE LA REVOLUTION FRANgAISE 283 (Paris
1834), quoted in C. Hesse, supra note 17, at 164; see also Hesse, supra note 72.
96. Declaration of the Rights of Man, supra note 75, art. 17.
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Revolutionary Copyright Practice: For What Kinds of
Works Was French Copyright Litigated? What Kinds
of Arguments Did the Advocates Press?

If the motivations for enacting the first French and U.S.
copyright laws were similar, what of the works they yielded?
Comparison of the subject matter the two laws covered suggests
that the two nations sought to promote dissemination of different kinds of works. The U.S. Constitution authorized Congress
to create a copyright system to "promote the progress" of
knowledge. Congress adopted a rather pragmatic view of the
kinds of works that achieved that objective: the first copyright
law protected maps, charts, and books-in that order. The great
majority of works for which authors or publishers sought copyright protection under that first statute were highly useful
productions.
The first French copyright law extended not merely to
"writings of all kinds" but to "all productions of the beaux
arts."97 Putting the two texts side by side, one might conclude
that one law promoted Utility while the other sought Beauty. In
fact, reports of French copyright infringement cases through
1814 indicate that, as in the U.S. and England, works of information or instruction were most often the subject matter of
copyright litigation.
Moreover, even when the complaint of the French copyright owner concerned works of higher Arts and Letters, the
arguments of the advocates would nonetheless sound familiar to
an Anglo-American copyright litigant: incentive rationales
loom large in the reasoning of lawyers and courts.98 The French
copyright law may have protected a broader range of subject
matter, but in both French and American cases, the subject matter advanced state interests. If the U.S. framers feared that art
might distract hard-working citizens from useful achievements,99
the French revolutionaries saw art, or at least some kinds of
97. Law of July 19-24, 1793, arts. 1, 7, 38 D.R.L. 444.
98. See, eg., Judgment of 29 therm. an 11, Cass. civ., [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.818
(reviewing the genesis of copyright law, defendant's advocate states "to advance the

sciences it was necessary to encourage the savants, a very appropriate encouragement
would be to assure them a private right over the printing and sales of their works");
Judgment of 12 vent. an 9, Trib. d'appel, Paris, [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 2.17, 2 J. Pal. 120

(discussed infra note 112).
99. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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art, 10 in the service of utility.
Art glorified the French Revolution and spread its ideals.
A criminal copyright infringement affair from the Year 7 of the
Republic illustrates the point.101 The work at issue was a play.
Theatrical works were among those creations that the Revolution sought to encourage.10 2 The pleading stressed the utility of
dramatic works in disseminating the Enlightenment and the
Revolution. The prosecutor, complaining of inadequate enforcement of dramatists' rights in the provinces, declared:
Shall literary properties be less sacred in the eyes of the republican judge than other properties? It is to the wise men, to dramatic authors, to all literary authors that we principally owe
the uncontested superiority of the French language over all the
languages of Europe. It is they who render all nations tributaries to our arts, tastes, genius, glory; it is through them that the
principles and rules of a wise and generous liberty penetrate
beyond our borders and sphere of activity.103
I turn now to a more systematic review of copyright
infringement actions and decisions under the law of 1793
(through 1814). This review examines both the subject matter
and legal basis of the claims, and the nature of the arguments
presented by the parties or sustained by the courts.
Of the thirty-seven controversies I have been able to gather
(some controversies consist of multiple hearings and appeals),
the subject matter of twenty-one concerns informational works.
Another fifteen cases concern works of drama, music, art,
poetry, or fiction. And the subject matter of one case is undisclosed. However, the initial subject-matter distinction between
information and art is not entirely satisfactory: many of the
100. Jefferson and the French revolutionaries agreed to this extent: In France too,

novels, it seems, were a disfavored form of literary expression. See infra note 103.
101. Judgment of 21 niv. an 7, Bureau criminel, Paris, excerpted in 2 R.I.D.A. 98
(1954).
102. For example, daily reports in Le Moniteur Universel often included listings of
plays in current performance in various theaters. The Feuille de correspondencedu libraire,
a biweekly listing of works published in France from 1791-92, lists many dramatic works,
many of these on republican or revolutionary themes. See, e.g., No. 56, "Les citoyens
frangais, ou le triomphe de la R6volution," prose drama in five acts by Pierre Vaque.
103. Judgment of 21 niv. an 7, 2 R.I.D.A. at 99. Not all literary expressions,
however, won revolutionary approbation. Drama might help spread the Enlightenment,
but novels, apparently, were considered retrograde and useless. See, e.g., Lefebvre de
Villebrune, Considdrationssur le commerce de la librairie, Mar. 19, 1794, in 3 PROCPS
VERBAUX, supra note 69, at 615 (1897), quoted in Hesse, The Dilemmas of Republican
Publishing, 1793-1799, at 12-13 (to be published in the LIBR. CONG. SYMP., PUBLISHING
AND READERSHIP IN REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE AND AMERICA

(1991)).
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works of drama and poetry at issue purport not merely to entertain, but also to educate. 1°4 Regarding the claims or defenses at
issue, of these thirty-seven controversies, eleven decisions concern formal or procedural defects in the copyright or its
05
enforcement. 1
This subject-matter breakdown does not purport to reflect
the overall relationship of published works of utility to published
works of entertainment; 10 6 rather, identification of the kinds of
works that spawned litigation serves to indicate the kinds of
works that generated sufficient popular demand to encourage
piracy. Reference to the many decisions involving formal or
procedural defects may elucidate the efficacy of the 1793 law in
protecting authors' rights. Frequent foundering of authors'
claims on these rocks suggests a copyright regime ill-adapted to
vigorous enforcement of, and therefore perhaps not warmly
receptive to, the author's monopoly.
Many decisions as reported forgo explaining the courts'
rationales; they simply state the subject matter and the result.
From the more detailed decisions, what approach to copyright
emerges? While some decisions assert or presume that copyright
inheres in the author, others, perhaps the majority, express or
rely on more external justifications for protection. In the first
group, a controversy from Year 2107 involved sales of unauthorized copies of memoirs. The plaintiff claimed the exclusive right
of reproduction and distribution. Although some sales of the
allegedly infringing copies took place after July 1793, the
defendant contended that it acquired the copies before passage
of the July 1793 copyright law. The defendant offered not to
sell unauthorized copies in the future. Challenging the retroac104. See, eg., Judgment of Dec. 2, 1808, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.609, 609
(works of Florian, including pastoral novels Estelle and Galatie; in his introduction to
Estelle, the author claims to have "given a degree of usefulness to the pastoral novel");
Judgment of July 2, 1807, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.406, 406 (poem and critical
essay, L'Imagination by Delille).
105. Bibliographic records for the revolutionary period are incomplete, but
information identifying published books and pamphlets may be garnered from: Feuille de
correspondence du libraire (1791-92); Journal Typographique et bibliographique (from
1797); see also A. BEUCHOT, BIBLIOGRAPHIE DE L'EMPIRE FRANgAIS (Paris 1813).
106. The names and sources for the cases, as well as capsule descriptions, are set forth

in the Appendix.
107. Judgment of 19 niv. an 2, Trib. ler arr., reported in 1 LES TRIBUNAUX CIVILS
DE PARIS PENDANT LA REvOLUTION (1791-1800), DOCUMENTs INEDITs RECUEILLIS
AVANT L'INCENDIE DU PALAIS DE JUSTICE DE 1871 (A. Douarche ed. 1905) 657
[hereinafter Douarche]. This decision was affirmed by Judgment of 13 flor. an 2, 1
Douarche 657, 658 n.2, and by Judgment of 8 therm. an 2, Trib. 4e ar., 1 Douarche 794.
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tive application of that law, the defendant disclaimed liability for
prior acts of copying and distribution.
The court ruled for the plaintiff, holding that "natural fairness, the first of all laws, sufficiently warned the printers and
booksellers that it was not permitted to appropriate the productions of others, and that any time one harms the property of
another, one is essentially obliged to compensate the harm suffered." The court's reasoning presumes that, even absent a law
regulating booksellers, the author has a property right. Yet the
court identified no formal source of this property right, 10 8 but
apparently perceived it as arising out of the creation of the work.
Moreover, the court did not refer to any public benefit derived
from protecting authors.
A later decision, Buffon c. Behmer,10 9 also recognized copyright protection for pre-1793 works, but not exclusively because
of general fairness or an inherent property right. Rather, the
Tribunal de cassation ruled that privileges granted under the
1777-78 edicts, if not expired under their own terms, remained
in force. The reasons offered for the persistence of ancien regime
printing privileges are of particular interest to this study.
Buffon's widow had charged a copyright infringement of
Natural History, whose forty-year printing privilege granted
under the ancien regime had not yet expired. The defendant
responded that the August 4, 1789, decree generally abolishing
ancien rdgime privileges had terminated the work's protection
and cast it into the public domain, and that the August 20, 1789,
decree establishing freedom of the press entitled the defendant to
publish whatever he wished. Buffon's widow appealed to the
Tribunal de cassation, arguing that the August 4 decree did not
apply to an author's rights under the prior edicts because these
rights were not feudal and therefore were not targeted by the
general abolition of privileges. Similarly, she contended, the
August 20 decree simply recognized that "each man being the
master of his own thoughts may write and publish them as he
desires"; 110 the decree in no way authorized the appropriation of
the works of others.
In holding that the 1777 decrees remained in force until
108. Cf Judgment of May 25, 1793, Trib. 3e arr., 1 Douarche 471 (infringement of
Paul et Virginie; validating seizure and condemning defendant to payment of the fine

"prononc6e par la loi"; court does not state what "law" is at issue).

109. Judgment of 29 therm. an 11, Cass. civ., [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.851.

110. Id at 852.
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prospectively superseded by the 1793 law, the court declared
that
the decrees of August 1789, which abolished privileges and distinctions, and set the press free, have no relation to the property acquired by an author in his work, and which is simply the
legitimate compensation for his work, and the price naturally
owing for the enlightenment which he spreads throughout
society. II

The court invoked both personal and external justifications for
protection; it grounded the author's rights both in the act of creation and in the public benefits flowing from it. Thus, the court
first endorsed the notion that authors have property rights in
their works as the fruit of their labors, but then invoked the policy (fundamental to Anglo-American copyright) that copyright
rewards authors because they contribute to the advancement of
public instruction.
Other cases also contain reasoning consistent with the twin
Anglo-American copyright goals of encouraging investment in,
and the creation of, works of authorship to promote public education.1 2 One of these, the protracted affair of the Dictionary of
the Acadimie franqaise,1 3 merits attention both for the statements of the government official intervening on behalf of the
plaintiffs, and for the Tribunalde cassation'sholding. The plaintiffs were publishers who succeeded to rights granted by the revolutionary authorities to a prior publisher to prepare a fifth
edition of the Dictionary. A new edition had been in preparation
when the Acadimie franqaise was suppressed by the decree of
August 8, 1793. Plaintiffs' edition, incorporating the academi111. Id. at 853. But the 1793 law did not alter the terms, duration, or protection for
works governed by the 1777 decree. See Judgment of 16 brum. an 14, Cass. crim., [1808] 2
Dev. & Car. 1.177; Judgment of 27 prair. an 11, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.818
(both holding that works whose 1777 decree term of protection had expired were not
entitled to new protection under the 1793 law).
112. See, e.g., Judgment of 29 therm. an 12, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.1023,
1023 (recognizing copyright in works by clerics because of the works' value to public
education); Judgment of 12 vent. an 9, Trib. d'appel, Paris, [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 2.17, 18, 2
J. Pal. 120, 121 (author's interest in publicly delivered speech: plaintiff's advocate asserted
that if speeches made in public were part of the public domain, then all authors would be
compromised because publishers would rely on free public sources rather than paying
authors for new written works); Judgment of 21 niv. an 7, Bureau criminel, Paris, No.
5380D.3, excerpted in 2 R.I.D.A. 98 (1954) (dramatic work discussed supra note 103 and
accompanying text).
113. Judgment of 7 prair. an 11, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.806, 3 J. Pal.
293; Judgment of 28 flor. an. 12, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.971, 3 J. Pal. 747;
Judgment of 6 for. an 13, Trib. d'appel, [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.103, 4 J. Pal. 505.
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cians' notes for new articles, appeared in Year 6. Three years
later, the defendants published a new edition of the Dictionary,
based on the edition last published by the Acaddmie and updated
with the defendants' own new articles.
In the ensuing infringement action, the defendants disputed
plaintiffs' copyright interest, arguing that with the abolition of
the Acaddmie franqaise, the Dictionary became public property,
available to all to republish or revise. The defendants also indicated that if anyone had a property interest in the Dictionary,
under the114
terms of the 1793 law' granting copyright to
"authors" ' and designating the "true owner" as the person to
whom the infringer must pay damages,115 that person could only
be the Dictionary's actual writers, not the State or the State's
publisher-grantees. Countering this defense, the commissairedu
gouvernement Merlin evoked a concept of authorship and of
copyright that we would now consider far more American than
French. Today the French copyright system generally proceeds
from the principles that the "author" is the actual physical creator of the work and that the creator's status as an employee or
commissioned party in no way affects authorship or initial title
to copyright.1 16 (By contrast, U.S. copyright has embraced the
doctrine of "works made for hire,"' 17 designating as "author"
and initial owner the employer or, in certain circumstances, the
commissioning party.1 18) Construing the 1793 French law to
favor plaintiffs' ownership claims in the Dictionary, Merlin
declared that the plaintiffs were the lawful grantees of the State,
and the State was the proper copyright owner of the Dictionary.
He elaborated:
The word authorsdoes not have, under the law, a meaning
as restrictive as defendants have asserted. The word designates
not only those who have themselves composed a literary work,
114. See Law of July 19-24, 1793, art. 1, 38 D.R.L. 444 (1857).
115. Id. art. 4 ("v6ritable propri6taire").
116. See Law'of Mar. 11, 1957, No. 57-298; art. 1. But see id. art. 13 (initial title to
copyright in collective works belongs to person or entity organizing the work's assemblage
and publication).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
118. Id.; see Varmer, Study No. 13, Works Made for Hire and on Commission, in 1
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT (Arthur Fisher mem. ed. 1963) (discussing 1909 Copyright Act
and its judicial interpretation). But see id. at 721 (asserting that older cases vested initial
copyright ownership, but not authorship status, in employer, citing Colliery Eng'r Co. v.
United Correspondence Schools Co., 94 F. 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899); Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 F.
Cas. 195 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1846) (No. 640) (both vesting initial copyright ownership in
employer or commissioning party)).
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but also those who have had it written by others, and who have
had the work done at their expense. ... The rights that belong
to the nation belong to it because it is the nation which itself
instituted and paid the Acad6mie frangaise to compose this
dictionary. 1 9

The court upheld the plaintiffs' assertion of a copyright
interest on the ground that the plaintiffs were the "true
owner[s]" envisioned by the 1793 text:
In the letter, as well as the spirit of the law, the true owner
to compensate for the infringement is the owner of the original
publication, that is, the publisher, because under the tort of
infringement only the publisher's interests are harmed by the
infringement of the original edition. 120

The court's reasoning diverges from a view of copyright as the
proper reward for the author's creativity. Rather, the real party
of interest was the person who financed and disseminated the
work. The court may have perceived the publisher as the proper
claimant of a right to compensation for its investment. But contemporary publishers did not directly claim such rights for
themselves; they claimed to be the contractual beneficiaries of
the authors' rights. 12 1 The court appears to identify the publisher as the true owner because, by funding and distributing the
work of authorship, the publisher is the vital link between the
work and its public.122
Other decisions casting doubt on the supposed author-centrism of French revolutionary copyright turn on the plaintiff's
compliance with formalities and the place of the work's first
123
publication. In these cases, the emphasis on territorial factors
119. Judgment of 7 prair. an 11, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.806, 3 J. Pal.
293, 297-98 (emphasis in original).
120. 3 J. Pal. at 300. In a later stage of the proceeding, the court rejected defendants'
assertion that their edition did not infringe plaintiffs' because they had not copied plaintiffs'
new material, but had added their own new articles. Citing both the 1793 law and the 1777
decree, the court held that copying and revising the underlying work was also infringement.
Judgment of 28 for. an 12, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.971, 3 J. Pal. 747. A final,
procedural, aspect of the case was decided in Judgment of 6 flor. an 13, Trib. d'appel,
[1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.103, 4 J. Pal. 505.
121. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
122. Cf Note, Joint Authorship of Commissioned Works, 89 COLUM. L. Rnv. 867,
877 (1989) (arguing that certain hiring parties should enjoy authorship status under U.S.
copyright law: "Recognizing deserving commissioners as joint authors is further conducive
to the constitutional purpose of benefiting the public insofar as it facilitates the exploitation
and distribution of creative works.")
123. See, eg., Judgment of Mar. 23, 1810, Cass. Crim., [1809-11] 3 Dev. & Car.
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or on fulfillment of state-imposed conditions 124 suggests that the
magistrates did not consistently perceive copyright as a right
inherent in the author. For example, the role of the deposit of
copies with the Bibliothe'que nationale as constitutive or merely
declarative of the author's rights remained ambiguous throughout the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods.125 If deposit constitutes, rather than simply proves, copyright, then the right
cannot arise out of the mere act of authorship.
Similarly, judicial pronouncements respecting the territoriality of authors' rights undermine the traditional characterization of revolutionary copyright as a confirmation of rights
inherent in the author. The key element in these cases is not
authorship, but completion of acts within French territory. Several controversies involved works copied in territories that subsequently became annexed to France, or works that were
initially published and sold abroad. In the annexation cases, the
courts generally held that once the territory became part of
France, defendant publisher was bound by French law, even
concerning copies made before annexation. 126 On the other
hand, if the work was first published abroad (in a territory not
annexed to France), and a third party published and deposited
copies in France before the author, the author had no rights in
France, even if the author became a French citizen. 127 Because
acts within the French territory were dispositive, even a stranger
to the work could acquire the rights of an author in France if he
became the first to publish there. Not until the middle of the
nineteenth century did France extend copyright to foreign
authors based on their authorship status, rather than on the
basis of first local publication. 128
1.167, 167; Judgment of 29 frim. an 14, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.197, 197;
Judgment of 17 niv. an 13, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.53, 54.
124. See, e-g., Judgment of Nov. 17, 1814, Cass. crim., [1812-14] 4 Dev. & Car. 1.630,
631; Judgment of July 2, 1807, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.406, 406; Judgment of
Mar. 23, 1810, 3 Dev. & Car. at 167; Judgment of 8 fruct. an 11, Trib. d'appel, Seine,
[1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 2.158, 159.
125. See supra notes 83-84 (discussion of decisions).
126. See Judgment of 29 frim. an 14, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.197, 197;
Judgment of 29 therm. an 11, Cass. civ., [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.851, 852.
127. See Judgment of 17 niv. an 13, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.53; Judgment
of Mar. 23, 1810, 3 Dev. & Car. at 167; see also Judgment of Jan. 30, 1818, Cass. crim., 52
J. Pal. 5, 12-13 (work first published in England by French 6migr6 held protected under
French law when author's French publisher published and deposited copies in France
before any competing French publisher's publication).
128. Decree of Mar. 28-30, 1852, cited in S. RICKEITSON, supra note 16, at 20-21.

France was the first country to extend reproduction rights to foreign authors without
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CONCLUSION

This examination of the French revolutionary sources of
copyright law reveals that revolutionary legislators, courts, and
advocates perceived literary property primarily as a means to
advance public instruction. Contemporary authorities certainly
also recognized authors' claims of personal rights arising out of
their creations, but the characteristic modem portrayal of
French revolutionary copyright as an unambiguous espousal of
an author-centric view of copyright '2 9 requires substantial
amendment. Similarly, this study has shown that familiar conceptions of early U.S. copyright also warrant reconsideration. If
U.S. copyright's exponents sought to promote the progress of
knowledge, they also recognized that the author's labors are due
their own reward. The revolutionary French and American systems shared much not only in theory, but also in practice. In
both systems, formalities encumbered, and sometimes defeated,
the acquisition or exercise of copyright protection. And both
systems primarily protected works useful to advancing public
instruction. An appreciation of the similarities between the initial French and U.S. literary property regimes may hold significance for modem copyright systems because it undermines
historical assertions of the inherent and original incompatibility
of the French and Anglo-American approaches to copyright. In
fact, modem advocates of international copyright harmonization
may draw upon a rich tradition of copyright congruity to formulate mutually acceptable principles for the protection of works of
authorship.

reference to reciprocity. On the other hand, France required that the work be protected in
its country of origin. See H. BATIFFOL & P. LAGARDE, 2 DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVA,
§ 530, at 200-01 & n.7 (7th ed. 1983). Moreover, protection did not initially extend to
public performances of foreign works in France. See Judgment of Dec. 14, 1857, Cass. req.,

1858 Recueil Dalloz P6iodique et critique 1.161, 164 (concerning Verdi operas).
129. See, eg., works cited supra notes 2, 5, 16 & 79.
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APPENDIX
DECISIONS ON AUTHORS' RIGHTS, OR INTERPRETING THE

1793 LAW (FROM 1793 THROUGH 1814)
I.

SOURCES:

A. Reporters
1. L.-M. Devilleneuve & A.-A. Carette, Recueil Gen6ral des
lois et des arr~ts [Dev. & Car.], ler s6r., 1791-1830 (Paris, from
1840).
2. Dennevers, Journal des Audiences de la Cour de Cassation
[Den.] (Paris, from 1808).
3. Les Tribunaux civils de Paris pendant la R6volution (17911800), Documents inedits recueillis avant rincendie du Palais de
Justice de 1871 (A. Douarche ed. 1905) [Douarche].
4. Ledru-Rollin, Journal du Palais Recueil de la Jurisprudence
Frangaise [J. Pal.] (1838).
B.

Digests:

1.

M.

MERLIN, RtPERTOIRE UNIVERSEL ET RAISONNt DE

(5th ed. Brussels 1826) (headings: Contrefagon,
Propri&6 Litteraire).
2. M. MERLIN, RECUEIL DE QUESTIONS DE DROIT (4th ed.
1828) (headings: Contrefagon, Propri6t6 Litteraire).
JURISPRUDENCE

C.

Periodical:

REVUE INTERNATIONALE" DU DROIT D'AUTEUR

[R.I.D.A.],

Jan. 1954, at 98-99.
II.
A.

CASES:

Post-1789 Copyright Cases Arising and Judged Before the
1793 Copyright Law
1. Judgment of Feb. 27, 1793, Trib. 6e arr., 1 Douarche 390
(following default judgment of Feb. 23, 1792), Bernardin de St.Pierre c. Prieur (alleged infringement-contrefaqon-of novels Paul
et Virginie and La Chaumie'reIndienne; seizure lifted for lack of
proof that defendant's copies were unauthorized; court did not
assert that no remedy is available because no law reprimanded
unauthorized copying and selling; the court did not refer to any
legal text). This decision was reversed by Judgment of May 25,
1793, Trib. 3e ar., 1 Douarche 471 (The court declared the
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seizure good and condemned defendant to payment of the fine
'"prononcdepar la loi," but did not say which law).
2. Judgment of Mar. 15, 1793, Trib. 5e arr., 1 Douarche 401,
Chaignieau c. Lachave (usurpation of title and format of newspaper Le Journaldu Soir; defendant imitated plaintiff's journal
"down to the smallest details" of typeface and layout; defendant
ordered to cease "falsely indicating the name" of plaintiff
publishers).
B.

Copyright Cases Arising Before 1793 Law, But Judged
Subsequently
3. Judgment of 19 niv. an 2, Trib. ler arr., 1 Douarche 657,
Latude c. Bossange (infringing copies and sales of plaintiff's
memoirs), aff'd, Judgment of 13 flor. an 2, Trib. ler arr., id. at
658 n.2, and by Judgment of 8 therm. an 2, Trib. 4e arr., 1
Douarche 794 [discussed in text].

C. Cases Both Arising and Judged Under the July 1793 Law
4. Judgment of 19 pluv. an 4, Trib. civ., Seine, 3e sec., 2
Douarche 282, Bernardin de St.-Pierre c. Siret (infringement of
Etudes de la nature); Judgment of 25 therm. an 4, Trib. civ.,
Seine, 2 Douarche 329 (appointment of expert for calculation of
damages).
5. Judgment of 5 flor. an 4, Trib. civ., Seine, 3e sec., 2
Douarche 305, Fabre d'Eglantine c. Barba (infringement of play
L'Intrigue 6pistolaire), aff'd, Judgment of 22 prair. an 4, Trib.
civ., Seine, 3e sec., 2 Douarche 318; Judgment of 24 therm. an 5,
Trib. civ., Seine, 3e sec., 2 Douarche 426; Judgment of 5 vent. an
6, Trib. civ., Seine, 2 Douarche 471.
6. Judgment of 14 fruct. an 5, Trib. civ., Seine, 3e sec, 2
Douarche 435, LaHarpe c. Barba (infringement ofDufanatisme
dans le langage rdvolutionnaire). Plaintiff-publisher included a
notice that his edition was "Avec Autorisationde l'Auteur" and a
further statement that "[w]e have just learned that someone is
engaged in counterfeiting this work: the publisher must be ignorant of the respect due to property. We leave to the enlightened
Public the task of avenging on our behalf this violation of all
principles .... "
7. Judgment of 29 therm. an 6, Trib. civ., Seine, 3e sec., 2
Douarche 550, Rousseau c. Parmentier (ordering defendant to
acknowledge Rousseau as the sole author of the Morale de
l'empereurMarc Aurle).
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8. Judgment of 13 frim. an 7, Trib. civ., Seine, 3e sec., 2
Douarche 582, Merlin c. Dufart (seizure and damages awarded
in favor of publisher of Works of Marmontel).
9. Judgment of 23 frim. an 7, Trib. civ., Seine, 3e sec., 2
Douarche 585, Merlin c. Garnery (confiscation ,and damages in
favor of publisher of Marmontel's Moral Tales).
10. Judgment of 21 niv. an 7, Bureau criminel, Paris, excerpted
in 2 R.I.D.A. 98 (1954) (drama) [discussed in text].
11. Judgment of 7 pluv. an 7, Trib. civ., Seine, 3e sec., 2
Douarche 606, Jeudy-Dugour c. Deterville (seizure and damages
in favor of publisher of Elementary Dictionaryof Botany).
12. Judgment of 13 pluv. an 8, Trib. civ., Seine, 3e sec., 2
Douarche 727, Gratiot c. Chenier (rejecting Chenier's demand
to confiscate unauthorized copies of speech he publicly delivered
in the Champ-de-Mars; trial court determined that the speech
was dedicated to the public and that the 1793 law was inapplicable), rev'd, Judgment of 12 vent. an 9, Trib. d'appel, Paris,
[1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 2.17 (noted infra at App. 12.1).
12.1 Judgment of 12 vent. an 9, Trib. d'appel, Paris, [1791] 1
Dev. & Car. 2.17, Chenier c. Gratiot (protectability of political
speeches delivered in public; plaintiff's advocate suggested that
if public speeches were freely copiable, their creation would be
discouraged).
13. Judgment of 7 vent. an 7, Trib. civ., Seine, Ire see., 2
Douarche 618, Merard-St.-Juste c. Maradan (publisher of the
Mdmoires de la Baronne Dalvigny-a work apparently "sought
after for its allusions licencieuses," id. at 618 n. 1-violated agreement to turn over profits from sales, and published an unauthorized second edition. The author had reserved ownership rights
in the work despite submitting the manuscript to a publisher).
14. Cass. 4 fructidor VII (affirming arr&t6 du directoire 27
messidor VII, annulling judgment of jury director of Lyon 8 flor.
VII), referredto in account of pleadings in Den. An XII p. 1 (the
work at issue was Rozier's Cours d'Agriculture).
15. Judgment of 27 vent. an 9, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. &
Car. 1.439, 440, Ministare Public c. Louvet (power of state to
bring criminal infringement action for infringement of novels,
including an apparently licentious work by the Chevalier de
Faublas and a work titled Emilie de Varmont); see also case
noted infra at App. 15.1.
15.1 Judgment of 9 mess. an 13, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. &
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Car. 1.130, Bidault c. Louvet (novels, Chevalier de Faublas and
Emilie de Varmont; issue concerned legality of seizure).
16. Judgment of 16 vent. an 10, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. &
Car. 1.606, Jean c. Auber (subject matter: prints of revolutionary battle scenes; bookseller held infringer, not mere reseller, of
illicit reproductions).
17. Judgment of 7 prair. an 11, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. &
Car. 1.806, Bossange c. Moutardier (the case of the Dictionnaire
de l'Acadimie) [discussed in text].
17.1 Judgment of 28 flor. an 12, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. &
Car. 1.971, Bossange c. Moutardier (Dictionnairede l'Acaddimie)
[discussed in text].
17.2 Judgment of 6 flor. an 13, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. &
Car. 1.103, Moutardier c. Bossange (Dictionnairede l'Acaddmie)
[discussed in text].
18. Judgment of 12 prair. an 11, Cass. crinm., [1791] 1 Dev. &
Car. 1.810, 810, Buffon c. Behemer (criminal jurisdiction in
affair regarding NaturalHistory, a pre-1793 work whose 40-year
privilege (if still valid) had not yet expired; court sustained prosecutor's arguments that under 1777 and 1778 edicts, copyright
infringement was a crime, and that these laws "were not at all
abrogated, but simply modified by [that] of 1793"); see also case
noted infra at App. 18.1.
18.1 Judgment of 29 therm. an 11, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev.
& Car. 1.851, Buffon c. Behemer (work on natural history; question of applicable law) [discussed in text].
19. Judgment of 27 prair. an 11, Cass. cfim., [1791] 1 Dev. &
Car. 1.818, Ducaurroy et Le Normand c. Bruisset (subject matter: work of religious devotion; if term of protection expired
during duration afforded under ancien rdgime dispositions, the
grantee could not now invoke a new term under 1793 law's
duration).
20. Judgment of 8 fruct. an 11, Trib. crim., Seine, 3 J. Pal. 431,
Lassaux c. Bertrandet, concerned Masson's Letters from a
Frenchman to a German; unauthorized copies of the work were
made before the authorized publisher effected deposit with the
Bibliothe'que nationale. Suit commenced following deposit.
Question: Does deposit give rise to, or at least perfect, the copyright, so that no predeposit copying is actionable, or does the
deposit simply enable the rights holder to initite court action?
The first-level court held the former and dismissed the
complaint.
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On appeal, plaintiff-publisher argued that the author is not
required to accomplish some act to create his rights, but only to
relinquish them. Plaintiff contended that the author's rights do
not "degenerate into public property" without either the
author's written consent or an express legal disposition. According to plaintiff, the 1793 law's deposit requirement was not sufficiently specific; it did not affect the property rights in existence,
it only conditioned the ability to bring a court action to enforce
the property right.
Defendant-bookseller argued that full rights do not attach
until the author has complied with the deposit because the
deposit requirement "is founded in the interests of all, upon the
need to promote the sciences and arts." Id. at 432. The court
reversed, without further discussion of the role of deposit other
than the observation that plaintiff, by depositing copies prior to
initiating suit, complied with the 1793 law.
21. Judgment of 29 therm. an 12, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. &
Car. 1.1023, Veuve Malassis c. Busseuil (works by clerics; bishops held to own copyrights like other citizens; rationale: "the
more publicly useful the work and the more it is related to public
instruction, the more necessary it is to eliminate counterfeit editions that are not avowed by their authors").
22. Judgment of 5 brum. an 13, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. &
Car. 1.12, 4 J. Pal. 220, Letourmy c. Huet-Perdoux concerned a
design for wallpaper, comprised of designs taken from prior
sources; plaintiff argued that the combination of the two prior
designs yielded a work "eiltirely new." He also suggested, "The
point is not to determine whether the design copied by [defendant] is my own property. But it is certain that I was the first to
deposit it at the Bibliothe'que nationale." 4 J. Pal. at 220. The
court held protection to be reserved to "those who truly are
authors, those to whom belongs the first conception of a work."
2 Dev. & Car. at 12-13. Since plaintiff's design was copied from
prior sources, he had no claim.
23. Judgment of 6 niv. an 13, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. & Car.
1.48, Williams c. Collignon (undisclosed literary work; issue
concerned calculus of damages).
24. Judgment of 17 niv. an 13, [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.53, 4 J.
Pal. 329, Pleyel c. Siebert (foreign musical work; no protection
in France for works by foreigners published abroad; suggestion
that unauthorized copies of new works made in France after foreigner's acquisition of French citizenship might be actionable.
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In his plaidoirie,plaintiff's lawyer seemed to have assumed that
fulfillment of formalities was an element of acquisition of the
property right: "Once the deposit is made, the author is master
of his works; no one may publish or sell them without his permission; his works are from that point an inviolate property." 4
J. Pal. at 329. Plaintiff's advocate also, unsuccessfully, essayed
some moral-ights-sounding arguments against defendant's rearrangement of Pleyel's works for different instruments. Id. at
329-30.)
25. Judgment of 5 flor. an 13, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. &
Car. 1.103, Buisson c. Joly (French translation of Adam Smith's
Wealth of Nations and work titled Le Souper de Vaucluse; issue
concerned regularity of seizure).
26. Judgment of 16 brum. an 14, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. &
Car. 1.177, Bruisset c. Guichard (work of religious devotionsame work as in 19; author assigned the work prior to 1793;
heirs held to have no rights under 1793 law because author had
already granted his rights pursuant to prior law).
27. Judgment of 29 frim. an 14, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. &
Car. 1.197, Vahlen c. Guillaume (subject matter: dramatic
works of Florian, translation of Cervantes's Don-Quichotte and
the history Numa Pompilius; liability found for unauthorized
copies made in Belgium pre-unification, but sold post-unification; calculus of damages for infringing sales).
28. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1806, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. &
Car. 1.299, Bruysset c. Albert Joly (Italian grammar; basic work
long in public domain; court ruled that plaintiff's additions were
too insignificant to revive protection in work. Court also stated
that under the 1793 law it was "formal and clear" that "the
author of a work acquires the public property right in it by conforming to formalities." Id. at 300.)
29. Judgment of July 2, 1807, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. &
Car. 1.406, C16mendot c. Giguet et Michand (poem and essay,
L'Imagination by Delille; issue: elements of criminal infringement).
30. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1808, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. &
Car. 1.609, Guillaume c. Stapleaux (works of Florian, including
Estelle and Galatde,Don-Quichotte (translation from Cervantes),
and Le Thddtre; infringing sales not presumed from listing of
work in defendant's catalogue).
31. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1808, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. &
Car. 1.609, Bernardin de St.-Pierre c. Stapleaux (studies of
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nature; infringing sales not pesumed from listing of work in
catalogue).
32. Judgment of Mar. 23, 1810, Cass. crim., [1809-11] 3 Dev.
& Car. 1.167, Sieber c. Erard (musical work; French grantee first
publishing in France and effecting ddpt ldgal entitled to bring
infringement action in France).
33. Judgment of July 3, 1812, Cass. crim., [1812-14] 4 Dev. &
Car. 1.143, 143 n.5, Dentu c. Malte-Brun (geographies; issue
appears to concern quantum of copying; distinction made by
advocates between infringement and plagiarism: copying without attribution of unprotectable material-geographical commonplaces-and even of scattered portions of new material, may
be plagiarism; it is not infringement because, according to the
Avocat general, there was no harm to author's property right,
but merely to his fame [limited concept of substantial copying
entailing infringement]).
34. Judgment of July 3, 1812, Michaud c. Prud'homme, cited
in Judgment of July 3, 1812, 1812 J. Pal. at n. 536 (holding in
the same terms).
35. Judgment of Sept. 4, 1812, Cass. crim., [1812-14] 4 Dev. &
Car. 1.185, Dentu c. Guillaume (translations of Ossianic and
other bardic poetry; issue concerned calculus of damages).
36. Judgment of Nov. 17, 1814, Cass. crim., [1812-14] 4 Dev.
& Car. 1.630, Robin c. Romagnesi (sculpture held within subject
matter protected by 1793 law "toute autre production des beaux
arts"; no deposit required).
37. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1814, Cass. crim., [1812-14] 4 Dev. &
1.636, Leclerc c. Villeprend et Brunet (protectability of compilations; originality of arrangement of old works of religious
instruction).
See also:
1. Prdcispour Edme Bidault librairie a' Dion, pour servir a' sa
requette prdsentie a' la Cour de cassation and summary of Judgment of 9 mess. an 13, noted supra at App. 15.1.
2. Mdmoire pour Antoine Pilardeauimprimeur de Pariscontre
M. Bel capitaine de gendarmerie a' Avignon (1806). This work
contains lawyers' memoranda concerning piracy actions by Paris
publisher Pilardeau against provincial unauthorized publishers/
sellers of a work variously titled Les Galanteries de Faublas,
Oeuvres du Chevalier de Faublas,L'Ami des Dames de Faublas.
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One defense, apparently unsuccessful, asserted that the work
was too licentious to deserve copyright protection.
The case between Pilardeau and Capitaine Bel is not in fact
an infringement claim, but one for false imprisonment. It seems
that rather than executing a seizure of a local pirate's edition,
the Avignon constable (allegedly in complicity with the pirate)
locked up the Paris publisher instead.

